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The Effect of Information and 
Communication Technologies 
on Urban Structure  
Yannis M. Ioannides, Henry G. Overman,  
Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, and Kurt Schmidheiny  
1. Introduction 
The geographic concentration of economic activity occurs because transport costs for 
goods, people and ideas give individuals and organisations incentives to locate close to 
each other. If such costs did not exist, then economic activity would tend to spread evenly 
over space. Historically, all of these transport costs have been falling. For example, steam, 
the railways, the combustion engine and the use of containers for transportation have all 
worked to reduce the cost of shipping goods, while the automobile, commuter railways 
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and the airplane have performed a similar role for the cost of moving people. More re-
cently, new information and communication technologies (ICT) have also significantly 
reduced the cost of transmitting and communicating information over both long and short 
distances. Such changes could lead us to predict the death of distance. That is, to suggest 
that location will no longer matter and that economic activity will, in the near future, be 
evenly distributed across space. This paper is concerned with one particular aspect of this 
prediction: the impact that less costly communication and transmission of information 
might have on cities, the urban structure and the spatial distribution of economic activity. 
Two innovations in the last century have changed dramatically the cost of communicat-
ing and transmitting information. The first is the widespread adoption of telephony (first 
fixed line, then mobile), which made possible oral communication over long distances. 
The second main innovation is the internet and E-mail which has played a similar role for 
written documents, voice and images. Both these technologies may require substantial up-
front fixed investments, but once made they essentially eliminate the link between the cost 
of communication and the distance between locations. 
What are the implications of these changes in ICT for urban structure and the distribu-
tion of economic activity in space? This paper provides a partial answer to this question. 
We begin with a brief description of the adoption path for a number of recent ICT innova-
tions before turning to consider in more detail the ways in which ICT might affect urban 
structure. We next present a formal model which helps clarify our thinking. Our model 
suggests that improvements in ICT will increase the dispersion of economic activity 
across cities. That is, it will make city sizes more uniform. In the empirical section, we 
test this prediction using cross country data and find empirical support for this conclusion. 
A concluding section spells out a number of policy implications. 
2. ICT and urban structure 
Changes in ICT are very clear in the data, especially if we focus on technology adoption. 
Figure 1 presents the number of cars, phone lines, mobile phones, and personal computers 
during the last five decades, using Comin and Hobijin’s “Historical Cross-Country Tech-
nological Adoption Dataset” [Comin and Hobijin (2004)]. The adoption of the telephone 
was well under way by the 1950's. By the end of the 1990's, the number of telephone lines 
exceeds 150 million in both Europe and the US. In contrast, changes in personal com-
puters are all concentrated in the 1980's and 1990's. The US went from less than 5 million 
computers in the early 1980's to more than 140 million computers in the late 1990's. This 
is a remarkable change that is likely to have very important effects. The data show a simi-
lar pattern for the EU that went from less than 5 million personal computers to 100 mil-
lion in the late 1990's. The EU and the US have also experienced similar dramatic changes 
in the use of cell phones, but with the growth occurring even later than for personal com-
puters. Mobile telephones technology was practically unused in 1985, but more than 150 
million people owned a mobile phone in the 1990's in the EU, and more than 85 million in 
the US. Of course, these numbers alone do not reflect the costs associated with implemen-
tation of these technologies but they do show the dramatic growth in adoption. In particu-
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lar, contrast the linear growth in number of cars or phones with the exponential growth in 
new forms of ICT. If part of the role of cities is to save on communication costs, and 
given that this dramatic growth in adoption has clearly lowered these costs, it seems intui-
tive that these changes could have some significant implications for urban structure. It is 
to these implications that we now turn. 
Economists use the phrase agglomeration economies to describe the advantages that oc-
cur when economic activity is densely concentrated. The first source of agglomeration 
economies is known as human capital or knowledge spillovers. In areas of dense eco-
nomic activity, workers casually exchange knowledge about technology and production 
conditions at their places of employment. Such transfers happen fortuitously but also are 
sometimes sought out deliberately by firms, as anecdotal evidence about life in Califor-
nia’s Silicon Valley testifies. A second force for agglomeration is labour market pooling. 
At any point in time, firms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks (e.g. as a result of changing 
demand for their particular product) that makes them want to hire or fire workers. Because 
these shocks are idiosyncratic, when one firm is firing, another firm may well be hiring. If 
firms locate together, it is easy for workers to move from firms experiencing bad times to 
those experiencing good times. As the saying in Silicon Valley goes, “people change jobs 
but not parking lots.” Agglomeration is thus attractive to workers because it insures them 
against idiosyncratic shocks. It is also attractive for firms because it dampens down the re-
sponse of wages to their own idiosyncratic shock. This actually makes employment more 
costly than it would otherwise have been in bad times, but this is more than compensated 
for by the ease of expansion in good times. A third force for agglomeration comes from 
 
Figure 1. Private Cars, Mobile Phones and Personal Computers.  
Source: Comin and Hobijin (2004). 
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the greater variety of intermediate products and richer mix of labour skills and expertise 
that are available in larger urban areas. Greater variety of goods and services lowers prices 
and wages and also enhances firms’ options in choosing technologies for production and 
distribution of their products. The associated effects on firms are known as pecuniary ex-
ternalities (as distinct from real externalities, the latter term being reserved for non-market 
interactions among economic agents’ output decisions). Finally, local amenities due to 
weather, physical attractiveness, culture or tradition are an important factor in enhancing 
the appeal of particular urban agglomerations. These mechanisms, which essentially go 
back to Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics, explain at least some of the spatial 
concentration that we observe throughout the world. 
Of course, if these agglomeration economies were the only forces driving the location 
of economic activity then we would expect to observe extreme spatial concentration. In 
reality, we do not, because these agglomeration economies are offset by costs (dispersion 
or congestion forces) as activity becomes increasingly concentrated. These costs take 
many forms but all arise from the fact that competition for local resources, broadly de-
fined, increases with spatial concentration. For example, congestion occurs as a result of 
increased competition for space, firms pay higher rents and wages as result of increased 
competition for land and workers, while they receive lower prices for their output as a re-
sult of increased competition in goods markets. The balance between these agglomeration 
and dispersion forces determines the spatial structure of the economy. 
The strength and importance of these agglomeration and dispersion forces depend on 
many things, including the cost of communicating information across space. Knowledge 
spillovers, for example, depend on the role that distance plays in inhibiting efficient 
communication of ideas. The importance of face to face communication shows just how 
dramatic can be these distance effects. But the telephone, the email and video conferenc-
ing, for example, are all reducing these costs of communicating ideas at a distance.  
Changing communication costs may also affect the benefits from labour market pool-
ing. Remember, these benefits require works to move from firm to firm. ICT may increase 
the efficiency of this process as news about vacancies in one firm are more easily com-
municated to workers who may be looking for work. A similar story could be told about 
the benefits of pecuniary externalities. For example, falling information costs allow firms 
to more easily identify potential suppliers of intermediate goods or skills. Turning to dis-
persions forces, ICT may facilitate e-working, allowing individuals to avoid the high costs 
of commuting in congested cities. Alternatively, it may increase the competition faced by 
firms as consumers find it easier to identify alternative sources of supply. 
Thus, new ways to transport ideas and communicate information are, in general, likely 
to affect all of the agglomeration and dispersion forces that urban and regional economists 
have identified as key determinants of the concentration of economic activity in space. 
Thus, independently of the sources of agglomeration forces, ICT will likely have an im-
pact on spatial concentration. In what follows, we illustrate the potential impact of ICT by 
focusing on production externalities as the main source of agglomeration. This gives us a 
prediction about the impact of ICT that we then confirm using real world data. These ef-
fects may also be consistent with other models where ICT has a similar effect on different 
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agglomeration economies. So, our exercise does not allow us to discriminate between dif-
ferent models which predict that ICT will disperse economic activity across cities. It does, 
however, suggest that models that predict the opposite changes to city structure (i.e. in-
creasing concentration) are not consistent with the data. 
ICT can, in principle, have many distinct effects on the distribution of economic activ-
ity in space. On one hand, it can increase the spatial scope of knowledge spillovers —it is 
easier for any professional to acquire context that helps her assess information she casu-
ally receives from counterparts in other firms. Therefore, fewer person-to-person interac-
tions may suffice to obtain a better understanding of what other firms are up to. To the ex-
tent that knowledge spillovers, whether deliberate (as among employees of the same firm) 
or fortuitous, are productive, we would expect that ITC would make them more effective 
among individuals who are located further apart. Local increasing returns are thus less lo-
calized when a wider set of people across a whole country or across countries can interact 
with each other by using new technologies and while economizing on commuting costs. 
In this sense, improvements in ICT reduce the importance of the quantities of productive 
factors employed in a city on that city’s productivity. This is the stand we take on the the-
ory we present in the next section. 
This implies that local urban agglomeration effects become less important and lead to 
less concentration of people and jobs in a few successful (and larger cities) or urban ag-
glomerations. Agents and firms obtain smaller benefits from locating close to each other 
and so they locate more evenly in space in order to economize on land rents (and other 
congestion costs). ICT, in particular, can help businesses create opportunities by improv-
ing their communications with other firms, suppliers and clients worldwide. For example, 
real estate, tourism and hotel operators may market their products directly, without relying 
on city-based intermediaries. This is important, as most of recent urban growth worldwide 
has been fuelled by growth in service sectors, while manufacturing has been relocating to 
smaller urban centres with good transportation links [Henderson (1997)] and often out-
sourced to lower cost countries.  
These arguments associate ICT with greater dispersion in economic activity. This 
would, in turn, imply larger concentration of the city size distribution. That is, it would be 
associated with a reduction in the variance of city sizes. Arguably, this potential advan-
tage may not be fully realized if the interurban transportation system does not develop 
sufficiently to serve a greater network of urban centres. However, at any given level of 
development, improvements in ICT increase the incentives for economic activity to relo-
cate to smaller urban centres. 
On the other hand, ICT may also make certain local public goods more important as a 
share of consumption or as a share of inputs. Also, changes in the industrial composition 
of cities, which have been favouring services, may on balance foster concentration of cer-
tain services due to increasing returns at the plant level. London, New York or Paris are 
attractive in part because there are certain products and services that can only be found 
there. Similarly, urban living affords better consumption prospects. As individuals spend 
more on amenities, such as theatres and other artistic activities, certain large cities would 
become relatively more attractive and therefore likely to grow relative to smaller or me-
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dium cities. On top of increasing the share of some of these goods and services in con-
sumption, better ICT may make these goods and services more readily available and 
cheaper to consume. Clearly, to the extent that public goods (and other forces of urban 
concentration) become effective and far reaching with ICT, we should observe a more 
dispersed distribution of cities and a more concentrated distribution of economic activity.  
From this verbal discussion it should be clear that there are two key paths through 
which ICT may affect the urban structure. But it is still not clear which effect is likely to 
dominate. Our next step is thus to develop a theoretical model which will make all these 
connections clear. In particular, it will connect changes in ICT with changes in the size 
distribution of cities. As we will show, the effect on urban structure generated by the 
model will depend on the particular assumption made on how ICT affects agglomeration 
forces. This relationship is monotonic and so it helps us design an empirical exercise that 
is informative on which of these different effects dominates in reality.  
3. A Model of ICT and Urban Evolution 
As discussed above, any reasonable model of urban structure or of the role of space in 
economic activity, more generally, would predict that improvements in ICT should have 
effects on the distribution of economic activity in space. However, no model of urban sys-
tems seems to have explicitly incorporated the effects of ICT. We use the theory in Rossi-
Hansberg and Wright (2007), from now on RHW, to illustrate how ICT may lead to more 
urban dispersion. As one may see in more detail in Appendix A, this is a dynamic model 
that allows for investment in both physical and human capital and yields very specific re-
sults about the properties of an urban economy in the long run. We incorporate ICT as a 
determinant of the agglomeration forces that drive productivity for each industry in each 
city. Each industry is assumed to be served by several cities and cities specialize com-
pletely. Therefore, changes in ICT can influence the typical sizes of cities specialized in 
an industry, which in turn will determine the concentration of economic activity is space.  
To reiterate, the trade-off between agglomeration effects —the benefits that firms and 
individuals obtain from being close to each other— and congestion costs determines the 
size of cities. Most of these agglomeration effects are related to interactions of different 
types among individuals. These interactions will be affected by the communication and 
information technology used by these agents. But how will ICT affect agglomeration 
forces? And how will these changes in agglomeration forces change the distribution of 
economic activity in space?  
The potential effect of ICT on the dispersion of the size distribution of cities is not ob-
vious. Essentially, we need to understand whether the consequences of productivity 
shocks, or of other shocks that cities may experience, will be more or less persistent, and 
will have larger or smaller effects, the larger agglomeration forces. The model in RHW 
views the connection between agglomeration effects and productivity as mediated by in-
dustry specific physical and human capital. Agglomeration effects are the result of an ex-
ternality generated by the amount of human capital and labour employed in the city.  
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To illustrate this mechanism, suppose that an industry receives a positive and persistent 
productivity shock. Naturally, firms in the cities that produce in those industries will want 
to produce more. This implies that they want to use more of the industry specific factors. 
But the total availability of those factors is given in the current period. So the price of the 
industry specific physical and human capital increases. The positive productivity shock 
also implies that cities specialized in that industry will grow as firms employ more work-
ers. The higher price of the industry specific human and physical capital will create incen-
tives to accumulate more of these factors. So next period the industry will have more in-
dustry specific factors. Because of the agglomeration effects (and this is the key) having 
more of these factors will imply more workers being hired and higher productivity, which 
in turn will elicit further accumulation of factors and induce larger cities, even if next pe-
riod’s productivity shock is lower. That is, the effect of the original productivity shock on 
city size will be persistent through its effect on the accumulation of industry specific fac-
tors. The stocks of these factors are determined by the accumulated history of the indus-
try’s productivity shocks and, therefore, the size distribution of cities is determined by the 
history of these shocks. It is the distribution of these factors across industries which then 
determines the size distribution of cities. 
The mechanism described above relies crucially on the impact that the level of human 
and physical capital has on the level of productivity in a city — that is, on the strength of 
the agglomeration effects. The stronger these effects, the larger the impact of past produc-
tivity and the larger the reaction of city size and industry specific factors to an idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock. If agglomeration forces are very small and the productivity of 
an industry producing in a given city is essentially independent of the level of human 
capital and employment in the city (and therefore the level of physical capital), today’s 
productivity shock will have only a temporary effect on city size and no effect on the long 
term stock of these factors. Hence, cities will not grow and may even decline substantially 
depending on the history of shocks to an industry. This implies that all cities will have 
similar sizes and so the distribution of city sizes will be extremely concentrated. If all cit-
ies are of similar sizes, the distribution of economic activity in space will exhibit a lot of 
dispersion. Note that the more concentrated the size distribution of cities the more dis-
persed the distribution of economic activity in space. 
In contrast, if agglomeration effects depend heavily on the amount of factors employed 
in a city, the effect of past shocks on the stock of industry specific factors will be very im-
portant. Cities specialized in industries that received a history of good shocks will be very 
large, and cities that received a history of bad shocks will be small. Hence, the size distri-
bution of cities will be very dispersed and the distribution of economic activity in space 
will be very concentrated. 
Our focus then is on the effect that ICT has on the relationship between the levels of 
human capital and employment in a city and the productivity of firms operating in that 
city. If improvements in ICT decreases the externality generated by human capital and 
employment in an industry it will lead to a more concentrated distribution of city sizes 
and more dispersion in the distribution of economic activity in space. If the reverse is true, 
so that improvements in ICT lead to larger externalities from employment and human 
THE EFFECT OF ICT ON URBAN STRUCTURE 
 
8 
capital, we should observe a more dispersed distribution of cities and a more concentrated 
distribution of economic activity in space. The model in RHW helps us link the effect of 
changes in ICT on urban agglomeration forces with the dispersion —or more precisely the 
variance— of the distribution of city sizes. 
We now present more details of the formal model in RHW (all derivations are relegated 
to Appendix A). Our choice of model is influenced by the fact that this framework allows 
for several important productivity effects in a dynamic setting that are key elements of the 
economic phenomena we wish to address. First, it allows for an industry-specific technol-
ogy shock for each industry over and above all variable inputs which may vary over time. 
This industry specific total factor productivity growth implies that output increases even 
while input quantities are constant. Second, it contains spillover effects in urban produc-
tion that are specific to each city. And third, it includes commuting costs which them-
selves may be affected by technological improvements. It follows Henderson (1974) in 
some of its features and proposes a theory of the size distribution of cities where the size 
of a city is determined by the city's core industry (cities specialize), the amount of indus-
try specific human and physical capital, production externalities in labour and human 
capital, and commuting costs. Each industry’s technology, that is its total factor produc-
tivity, is defined as a weighted geometric mean of the industry’s total employment and in-
dustry-specific human capital in the city, and an additional factor that is random and is an 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) productivity shock with constant mean and 
variance.  
We measure the importance of knowledge spillovers from total industry employment 
via the elasticity jγ  and from industry specific human capital in the economy via the elas-
ticity jε . These elasticities depend on the weight each receives in the determination of in-
dustry j total factor productivity. These parameters are external to individual firms in the 
industry (that is, beyond those firms’ control), but internal to the urban economy due to 
the presence of city developers. City developers arbitrage across city sizes.  
Ideally one would model explicitly the decision of agents in a city to adopt ICT. This 
has not been done in the literature in a way that may be readily adopted for our purposes. 
Here we only study the effect on urban structure given exogenous technology adoption 
decisions. A very simple way to introduce the effect of ICT is to let those two elasticities 
vary with the quality of information technology, .ι The nature of the dependence repre-
sents two alternative effects of ICT. We may assume that ICT weakens the importance of 
agglomeration effects, if the parameters ( )j tγ ι  and ( )j tε ι  decrease as ICT improves. 
Since people located far away can now interact at a smaller cost, and thus people do not 
have to be close together to be productive, agglomeration effects attenuate at a slower rate 
with distance, and so people living in a city are less important in determining that city's 
productivity level. Conversely, assuming that both ( )j tγ ι  and ( )j tε ι  increase with the 
quality of ICT would be consistent with a greater importance of city specific factors (like 
public goods) as a result of changes in ICT. In such a case, the larger both of these pa-
rameters the more important are a city's total human capital and employment in determin-
ing city-specific total factor productivity for industry j. Which effect dominates is, ulti-
mately, an empirical question that we try to settle in this paper.  
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In modelling an economy’s urban structure, the theory recognizes an important trade-
off that is generated by city geometry. Cities consist of a central business district, where 
all agents work and all production is located, and residential areas surrounding it. Each 
agent consumes the services of one unit of land per period. In a spatial equilibrium within 
each city, agents should be indifferent over where to live. Therefore, equilibrium rents 
should vary with location so as to compensate agents for increased commuting costs, with 
rents at the city edge assumed to be equal to zero. In the model these costs per person in-
crease with city population capturing increasing congestion. On the other hand, any given 
amount of employment and human capital in a city is not only directly productive, but 
also indirectly through the spillover effects.  
With a given national population, as the number of cities varies, the total congestion 
costs and the output of the city’s industry, which reflects both effects of employment and 
human capital, change at different rates. Therefore, a trade-off emerges which, with a 
given national population, implies a specific number of cities. Cities exhibit optimal sizes 
as city developers internalize the external effects at the city level. Since the knowledge 
spillovers are city- and industry-specific, it pays for cities to specialize. That is, a city’s 
silk industry should not be burdened by extra congestion costs imposed by a semiconduc-
tors industry and the developer ensures that this is the case.  
The process of city formation resembles free entry equilibrium in the textbook case of 
an industry with firms that have U-shaped cost curves. In equilibrium, with free entry, all 
cities produce at the average cost minimizing quantity of output and the industry is served 
by an appropriate number of cities. Thus, aggregate industry output effectively exhibits 
constant returns to scale. RHW attribute urban growth to the outcome of the trade-off be-
tween commuting costs and knowledge spillovers, which reconciles increasing returns to 
scale at the local level and constant returns to scale at the aggregate level.  
Given this log-linear specification, RHW show (see Appendix A) that the variance of 
city sizes for each industry is given by  
( ) ( )
2 2
0
1ln 4
1 2 1 2
j
tj
j j j j j
V s
β
ν
γ ε γ ε β
    
      = +      
− + − + +     
. (1) 
where ln tjs  is the size of cities specialized in industry j at time t, and jβ  is the capital 
share in production. Note from Equation (1) that the variance of the city size distribution 
is increasing in the sum of the elasticities of the spillover effects, ( ) ( )tjtj ιε+ιγ . So if 
these elasticity parameters depend negatively on the quality of ICT, the variance is de-
creasing in tι , or decreases as ICT improves. Or, put differently, ICT makes the city size 
distribution more concentrated, or the distribution of economic activity in space more dis-
persed.  
In the previous paragraph we have taken the stand that improvements in ICT reduce 
( ) ( )tjtj ιε+ιγ . However, if better ICT increases the importance of public good or in-
creases agglomeration forces in general, then ( ) ( )tjtj ιε+ιγ  would increase with im-
provements in ICT. Public goods and other forces would increase local spillover effects 
and therefore would lead to exactly the opposite effects than the ones derived above: A 
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less concentrated size distribution of cities and a more concentrated distribution of eco-
nomic activity. The data can potentially help us distinguish the role played by changes in 
the quality of ICT on urban structure, and through the theory, the effect of better ICT on 
the elasticity of technology to urban factors. In the next section we turn to study this rela-
tionship empirically.  
The model above incorporates ICT only in reduced form. One could also go deeper into 
the specification of the spillover functions ( )j tγ ι , and ( )j tε ι  by trying to model the ef-
fect of lower communication costs on total factor productivity. We refrain from doing so 
because it is unlikely that in view of our data we would be able to distinguish between al-
ternative theories of the precise role of ICT in affecting the elasticities of the spillover ef-
fects.  
Finally, one can also incorporate the impact of ICT on commuting costs (as in the nota-
ble increase in the use of personal vehicles documented above, or because of telecommut-
ing) by letting commuting costs depend on ICT. The effect of ICT on commuting costs af-
fects city growth rates independently of their scale. As shown in Appendix A, lower 
commuting costs as a result of improvements in ICT result in all cities’ growing at a faster 
rate. Thus, declining commuting costs change the mean of the distribution of city sizes but 
not its shape or variance. As the prediction concerning the variance is the one we take to 
the data this justifies our focus in the preceding discussion of the model. 
4. Empirical Methodology 
Our theoretical model predicts that ICT should make the distribution of city sizes in the 
long run more concentrated if it weakens agglomeration effects. We study this prediction 
empirically by looking at the effect of ICT on the distribution of city sizes across different 
countries. 
Unfortunately, as will be clear when we discuss our data in Section 5 below, the avail-
able data only tend to cover the larger cities in each country. This is a problem for our 
empirical implementation because such truncated data (i.e. data that do not cover the 
smaller cities) do not allow us to calculate the mean and variance of the entire city size 
distribution directly. To get around this problem, we proceed as follows. First, we assume 
that the city size distribution is Pareto (alternatively referred to as following a power law). 
Given this assumption we can express the log of the proportion of cities that are larger 
than S, that is the log of the counter-cumulative of the size distribution of cities, as a linear 
function of log city size:  
ln ( ) ln ln
o
P s S S Sζ ζ> = − + , (2) 
where 
o
S  denotes the minimum city size and ζ the elasticity of the proportion of cities 
larger than S with respect to S,  a negative number that is commonly referred to as the Zipf 
coefficient. See Box 1 for details. Given a set of cities, an estimate of the Zipf coefficient 
is provided by running a regression of log rank on log city size. How does this help us? 
First, because when the distribution is Pareto the Zipf coefficient can be consistently esti-
mated by running the regression only on the largest (i.e. truncated) sample of cities. Sec- 
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BOX 1: Zipf’s law and the Pareto distribution 
 
Zipf’s law for cities [Zipf (1949)] is an empirical regularity that has attracted consider-
able interest by researchers. In its strict version, which is also known as the rank-size 
rule, the law is a deterministic rule that states that the second largest city is half the size 
of the largest, the third largest city is a third of the size of the largest city, etc. To illus-
trate, let us take a country (for instance the US), and order its cities by population: New 
York as the largest has rank 1, Los Angeles as the second largest has rank 2, etc. We then 
draw a graph, known as Zipf’s plot (see Fig. B.1): on the y-axis, we place the log of the 
rank (New York has log rank ln1, Los Angeles log rank ln2); on the x-axis, the log of the 
population of the corresponding city (which will be called the size of the city). If the 
rank-size rule holds, this produces a downwards sloping line with slope equal to -1.  
Generally, and to a remarkable extent, statistical analyses for many different countries, 
as Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) discuss in detail, obtain estimated coefficients that are 
concentrated often around one. This indicates that the size distribution of cities is well 
approximated by Zipf's law with coefficient one. Nevertheless, there is substantial varia-
tion in Zipf's coefficients across time and across countries, a fact that ought to cause 
some doubts as to full validity of the law.  
Consider the three Zipf plots on Fig. B.1. They look quite similar to one another, yet 
the slopes of ordinary least squares lines fitted to them are not equal to -1.  Note that the 
plot for France is steeper than that for UK which in turn is steeper than that of the US; the 
respective estimates are -1.55, -1.46, and -1.37, are all estimated with very high precision 
and using 96, 232 and 552 observations, respectively. Note also that the plot for the US is 
furthest to the right because its cities are larger than those of the UK with the same rank, 
whose plot in turn is further out than that of France, for the same reason. The techniques 
employed in the main part of the paper are aimed at backing out from such differences 
the effect of ICT across countries and over time. 
Can we obtain Zipf’s law by means of theoretical arguments? The simplest direct theo-
retical argument one could make would be by invoking Gibrat’s law. If different cities 
grow randomly with the same expected growth rate and the same variance (Gibrat’s Law 
for means and variances of growth rate), then the limit distribution of city sizes con-
verges to Zipf ’s law. See Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) for an extensive discussion of 
this issue. Empirically, on the other hand, Zipf’s law for cities is an instance of a power 
law (see further below for details). Power laws are attractive in various sciences, espe-
cially in physics, because they are “scale free”, in that they do not depend on the defini-
tions of units of measurement. Naturally, this is an important concern in physics. Rossi-
Hansberg and Wright (2007) provide a rigorous justification for a power law that is di-
rectly rooted in economic theory. It follows as a special case of the model outlined in 
Appendix A. 
A power law of cities states that the proportion of cities that are greater than a particu-
lar city of size S , the counter-cumulative of the size distribution of cities, is of the form:  
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Figure B.1. Zipf's plots for three countries.  
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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where ζ denotes a negative parameter, and oS  the lower boundary of the distribution, 
also a parameter and itself a function of the various determinants of city sizes as dis-
cussed in the main body of the paper and Appendix A. The mean city size and the vari-
ance associated with the law given by Equation (B.1), which is also known as a Pareto 
probability distribution, are given by: 
2
2
01 ( 1) ( 2){ } ; { } .o oS E S S V S S
ζ ζ
ζ ζ ζ+ + += = =  (B.2) 
The mean is finite, if 1;ζ >  the variance is finite, if 2.ζ >  Zipf’s law is the case of 
a Pareto law with 1.ζ = − These properties also help underscore that the rank-size rule 
cannot correspond to a reasonable probability distribution, strictly speaking, as such a 
distribution would have neither a finite mean nor a finite variance.  
With these caveats, it is still interesting to note that with our data, reasonable good sta-
tistical fits are obtained when we regress the log rank against log city size and a constant, 
which is the so-called Zipf regression. Interestingly, for all country-year pairs we strongly 
reject the null hypothesis that the Zipf coefficient is equal to minus one. In other words, 
we strongly reject Zipf’s law, strictly construed.  
“Every cloud has a silver lining,” however. Starting from an empirical law, like Zipf’s 
law, one may motivate a more general and far reaching inquiry into urban structure and 
growth and therefore on the determinants of city size distributions. This is what we have 
sought to do in this paper! 
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We think that rigorous research along the lines of our paper helps caution economists, 
sociologists, urban scientists and econophysicists against undue predictions. E.g., as 
groups of countries integrate, like the EU, economic forces are unleashed which reshape 
their urban systems. What is likely to happen to the sizes of their larger cities and their 
ranks? Zipf’s law offers a straightforward prediction. But is it reliable? We think not, and 
have instead proposed a way to make predictions that rely on underlying determinants of 
city sizes in a dynamic world. 
 
ond, because for a Pareto distribution changes in the Zipf coefficient map one to one to 
changes in the variance of the city size distribution.  
We have underscored the model’s prediction that improvements in ICT will decrease 
the variance of the cross-sectional distribution of cities. In Appendix A we show that this 
leads to a higher absolute value of the Zipf coefficient, ( )Sζ . Hence, the absolute value 
of the Zipf coefficient increases with improvements in ICT, at least when attention is re-
stricted to the upper tail of city sizes. In other words, improvements in the quality of ICT 
decrease the variance of the size distribution while they increase the absolute value of the 
Zipf coefficient. Since the Zipf coefficient is negative, they decrease its algebraic value. 
This result holds independently of whether the size distribution is Pareto. Of course, if it 
is not Pareto, the Zipf coefficient will not be a constant, but the model predicts that its 
value will change in the same direction for all, large enough, city sizes. It is important to 
note that even though the theory in the previous section implies a Pareto distribution of 
city sizes only for particular cases (see RHW for details), we approach the data using Zipf 
coefficients that are specified as independent of city size. That is, we assume that the size 
distribution is always Pareto.   
So our assumption of a particular distribution for city sizes gives us a specification that 
can be estimated given the data that we have at our disposal and that allows us to directly 
test our theory on the impact of ICT on the city size distribution. The crucial question is 
then, of course, whether this is an appropriate assumption. It turns out that empirical evi-
dence give us good reason to think that the Pareto distribution is a reasonable fit for real 
world city size distributions across a large numbers of countries and at many different 
points in time. Even if the distribution is not Pareto, it is likely that reductions in variance 
will be associated with the same direction of change for the Zipf coefficient (as discussed 
above). In the empirical section, we also address this concern by presenting robustness 
checks using other measures of dispersion in the upper tail. 
Once we have the estimated Zipf coefficient, we may use it as a summary of the city 
size distribution for different countries and examine how variations in the city size distri-
bution may be attributed to the observed changes in ICT. Clearly a large number of other 
factors will determine the city size distribution and we will need to control for these if we 
want to isolate the effect of ICT. We discuss and motivate these additional controls in the 
results section below. 
To capture the effects of ICT we use data on the number of telephone lines and on ac-
cess to the internet. Our main focus is on the number of telephone lines for several rea-
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sons. First, because we have more data. Second, because the impact on the urban structure 
will take time and, as Figure 1 shows, the rapid adoption of internet technology has only 
occurred relatively recently. Third, because for telephone lines we have a way to deal with 
the endogeneity problem for ICT. That is, we have a way to control for the fact that the 
number of telephone lines or internet connections may be driven by the urban structure, 
rather than the other way round. To allow for this, we need to find a suitable instrumental 
variable that is correlated with the number of telephone lines, does not independently af-
fect the urban structure and is unlikely to be affected by changes to that urban structure. 
Information on the industrial organization of telecommunications sector provides such a 
variable because it is related to the number of telephone lines, but should not independ-
ently affect urban concentration. We believe this is a natural way to proceed, since it is 
hard to argue that urban concentration directly influences the competition status of the 
telecommunication sector in a country or vice versa. As no such instrumental variable is 
available for the internet, our results there are necessarily more speculative (although both 
sets of results point in the same direction). 
The Zipf coefficient for a country c  in year t  is obtained from the following regres-
sion: 
ict ct ct ict ictR P eλ ζ= + + , (3) 
where ln(rank )ict ictR =  is the log of the rank of city i  in country c  in year t , ictP  is the 
log population of that city, 
ctλ  is a country-year specific intercept, and ctζ  is a country-
year specific Zipf coefficient. 
To analyze what factors explain the city size distribution Rosen and Resnick (1980), 
with that work subsequently having been updated by Soo (2005), take the estimated Zipf 
coefficients 
ctζ  from a regression like (3) and seek to understand its determinants in terms 
of generally time-varying country-level characteristics. This is accomplished by means of 
a (so-called second step) regression of the estimated Zipf coefficients for each country and 
year, ˆ
ctζ , against ctX , a collection of explanatory variables that are thought to determine 
the city size distribution. That is:  
ˆ
ct ct ctXζ θ η ε= + + , (4) 
where θ  is a constant and η  is a vector of coefficients. From among the explanatory vari-
ables we include telephones per capita, density of roads, volatility of growth of GDP per 
capita and other variables. 
We implement a similar approach, but make three modifications. The first deals with a 
potential bias in the estimation of the Zipf coefficient. The second increases the efficiency 
of the estimators by implementing a one-step procedure rather than the two-step proce-
dure just described. The third exploits the fact that we have panel data and thus may con-
trol for unobserved country specific determinants of differences in the city size distribu-
tion. We describe each of these three modifications in turn. 
In a recent paper, Gabaix and Ibragimov (2006) return to a known bias of the estimate 
of the Zipf coefficient from Equation (3). This bias arises from the fact that ranks and 
sizes are obviously correlated. The bias is strong in small samples and their proposed cor-
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rection is to use ln(rank 0.5)ict ictR∗ = −  in place of the log rank in the left hand side of 
Equation (3). We implement that correction here and run a regression like (3),  
,ict ct ct ict ictR P eλ ζ∗ = + +  
where ictP , ctλ  and ctζ  are defined as before. Our second change is to recognise that in-
stead of adopting the two-step procedure found in the existing literature, we can get more 
efficient estimators if we substitute for ctζˆ  from Equation (4) into equation (3) and esti-
mate instead:  
[ ]ict ct ict ct ict ictR P X P eλ θ η∗ ∗= + + + , (5) 
where ∗icte  is now composed of an i.i.d. error plus the interaction between rank and error 
from the first step, while all other coefficients and variables are as defined before. 
Both the two-step and one-step procedures —Equations (3)-(4) and (5), respectively— 
control for observable country characteristics that may affect the city size distribution. 
However, as we have ranks of cities and explanatory variables for several years, we can 
also control for unobserved country characteristics that may affect the distribution. Con-
tinuing to implement the Gabaix-Ibragimov we work with the following modification of 
Equation (6):  
[ ] .ict ct c ict ct ict ictR P X P eλ θ η∗ ∗= + + +  (6) 
The only difference from Equation (5) is that the log population of city i , country c , 
time t  is allowed to have an effect which is country specific, 
c
θ . Of course, as one would 
expect, if 
ctX  contains time invariant observed characteristics then their coefficients can-
not be separately identified via econometric procedures that allow for unobservable coun-
try-specific effects.  
Before turning to the implementation of our approach, we re-iterate that, although we 
rely on Zipf’s law to motivate our econometric approach, our estimations should generally 
capture the impact upon the entire distribution of city sizes that emanate from changes in 
underlying determinants of interest. 
5. Data 
We use the same city data as that used in Soo (2005), which were taken from Thomas 
Brinkhoff's City Population project (http://www.citypopulation.de). Soo's paper provides 
a fairly extensive discussion of the nature of the data, particularly with regard to the issue 
of the definition of cities.1 Data on population, GDP per capita in 2000 Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP), trade and government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, non-agricultural 
economic activity and land area come from the World Bank World Development Indica-
tors (online). Data on kilometres of roads come from the International Road Federation 
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 We use data on cities as opposed to urban agglomerations because they are more con-
sistently available internationally.  
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World Road Statistics.2 GDP growth is calculated as log difference of GDP in 2000 PPP; 
its volatility is measured as the empirical standard deviation over the observed time pe-
riod. 
We use two different measures to evaluate the role of ICT in determining the city size 
distribution: telephones and the internet. As already discussed, our main focus is on tele-
phones, because we have data for a longer time period. Data on the number of telephone 
land lines and internet users per 1000 also come from the World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators. We multiply these numbers by 1000 and use per capita measure of phone 
lines and internet users in the estimations. 
We also use two sets of variables as instruments to purge two explanatory variables of 
their endogeneity. The first set, and the most crucial, provides information on the market 
structure of the telecommunications sector (private or public monopoly versus competi-
tive provision) and is used to instrument the number of telephone lines. The telecommuni-
cations data are taken from the OECD International Regulation Database.3 We use these 
variables to instrument the number of phone lines, as discussed further below. A second 
set of variables are used to instrument for trade as a percentage of GDP and are derived 
from information on membership of the two most important regional preferential trade 
agreements for several of the countries that we consider, that is, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Economic Community and the European 
Union, as appropriate in the respective years (EEC/EU). The membership variables were 
constructed by the authors based on the year in which countries joined the respective trad-
ing area.4 
We start with city-level data for 73 countries covering 7,530 different cities recorded at 
various time periods between 1972 and 2001. There are 197 country-year pairs meaning 
that, on average, we observe each country 2.7 times. Detailed inspection of the data re-
veals that the relevant explanatory variables are missing for many countries. Fortunately, 
the variables are available for three blocks of countries -- North America, Europe and 
some of the former countries of the Soviet Union.5 Deleting countries with missing data 
                                                          
 
2
 Further details on all these variables are provided in Soo (2005). A large number of 
our explanatory variables were also kindly provided by Kwok Tong Soo. 
3
 See the Indicators of Product Market Regulation Homepage at: 
http://www.oecd.org/eco/pmr and described in Conway (2006). Missing data points for 
Eastern European countries were filled by the authors based on media coverage. 
4
 Other variables may also, of course, be endogenous, but these are the two for which 
we have been able to construct reasonable instruments. 
5
 Specifically, we use data on Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Por-
tugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom and the United States. We have to drop Germany because of 
the reunification of 1990 and the ensuing adoption of Federal Republic of Germany in-
stitutions in former German Democratic Republic territory causes definitional problems.  
THE EFFECT OF ICT ON URBAN STRUCTURE 
 
17 
leaves us with 24 countries covering 2,955 cities recorded at various time periods between 
1980 and 2000. There are now 63 country-year pairs meaning that, on average, we ob-
serve each country 2.6 times. For the internet regressions we have to drop Mexico and re-
strict the time period to 1990 to 2000. This gives us 23 countries and 41-country year 
pairs covering 2,792 cities. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used 
in our empirical analysis below. Additional details on our data variable definitions may be 
found in the online Data Appendix. 
6. Results 
We start by estimating Equation (5) for each country-year pair to get some idea of the 
distribution of Zipf coefficients for the countries in question. The mean Zipf coefficient 
across our 63 country-year pairs is -1.370. The maximum value is -0.928 for Belarus in 
1998, the minimum is -1.714 for Belgium in 2000. Interestingly, for all country-year pairs 
we strongly reject the null hypothesis that the Zipf coefficient is equal to one.6 In other 
words, we strongly reject Zipf’s law, strictly construed. See Box 1, for more details. 
We now turn to consider the effect that ICT has on the city size distribution as summa-
rized by the Zipf coefficient. As discussed in the data section, our main focus is on the 
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 Our result are broadly in line with those reported in Soo's 2005 table 1 which are for 
the last year for each country-pair and which do not implement the Gabaix-Ibragimov 
correction, unlike regressions along the lines of Equations (5) - (6), which do so. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
    Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
City specific variables      
 City size 132,282 339,529 10,054 8,405,000 6975 
 Normalized city size 0.0042 0.0105 0.0002 0.2024 6975 
 log(norm. city size) -6.31 1.25 -8.64 -1.60 6975 
Country specific variables      
 Phone lines per capita 0.402 0.178 0.065 0.722 63 
 log(Phone lines per capita) -1.043 0.574 -2.736 -0.326 63 
 Inverse road density 0.033 0.067 0.002 0.329 63 
 Country population 35,200,000 57,400,000 4,209,000 282,000,000 63 
 log(country population) 16.632 1.108 15.253 19.458 63 
 GDP per capita, PPP 18,287 7,838 4,369 33,970 63 
 log(GDP per capita), PPP 9.692 0.544 8.382 10.433 63 
 Trade, % GDP 0.735 0.317 0.205 1.680 63 
 Non-agric. sectors , % GDP 0.936 0.054 0.732 0.988 63 
 Gov. expend., % GDP a 0.378 0.082 0.161 0.490 63 
 Std. dev. of GDP growth 0.029 0.019 0.013 0.083 63 
 land area 1,612,057 3,853,566 30,230 16,900,000 63 
 log(land area) 12.390 1.748 10.317 16.642 63 
  Number of cities/1000 a 0.112 0.116 0.022 0.570 63 
Notes: For variable definitions, see text and Data Appendix (http:www.xxx.xxx). a Average over time.  
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impact of phone lines. Figure 2 plots our estimates of Zipf coefficients for different coun-
tries at different times against the number of telephone lines. Two things stand out from 
the plot. The first is that, overall, the relationship between Zipf coefficients and the num-
ber of telephone lines is as predicted. Second, looking at individual countries, we can see 
the same effect replicated within the country in terms of changes over time. This is, per-
haps, easiest to see for Belgium (BEL) and Austria (AUT) but careful inspection will 
convince the reader that a similar pattern is observed for many countries. The rest of this 
section formalises the findings that emerge from this scatter plot, showing that they are 
robust to the introduction of additional explanatory variables and to controlling for the 
endogeneity of telephone lines. 
We begin by estimating the simplest possible specification where we treat phone lines 
as the only variable that explains differences in the Zipf coefficient across countries and 
time. That is, we estimate Equation (5) with phone lines as the only explanatory variable 
(
ctX ). The results are shown in column [1] of Table 2. Phone lines have a significant 
negative impact on the Zipf coefficient. That is, the more phone lines a country has, the 
more concentrated is its city size distribution. This is consistent with our theoretical result 
above when ( ) / 0j t tγ ι ι∂ ∂ <  and ( ) / 0j t tε ι ι∂ ∂ <  and so improvements in ICT (or, in 
the data, an increase in the number of phone lines) lead to smaller local external effects 
and therefore a more concentrated city size distribution. 
Clearly, there are many omitted characteristics of countries that could be correlated 
with both phone lines and the degree to which population is spread out across the city size 
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Figure 2. Estimated Zipf Coefficients against Telephone Mainlines per 1000  
Inhabitants, different countries and years. Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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distribution. Column [2] begins to address this problem by including several additional 
explanatory variables. Before turning to discussing the empirical results, we briefly moti-
vate each of the additional control variables.  
We include the inverse of road density as a proxy for transport costs within the country. 
Countries with a low road density are likely to have high transport costs encouraging 
population to concentrate in just a few cities. Thus, we expect the coefficient on inverse 
road density to be positive (fewer roads imply higher inverse road density, higher trans-
port costs and urban population that is more concentrated in fewer cities).  
We include three variables to control for the economic and geographic size of the coun-
try: population, income and land area. More densely populated countries are likely to have 
Table 2: Phone lines and the city size distribution 
 OLS  IV 
Dep. variable log(rank-0.5) [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
log(city size)          
   × log(Phone lines per capita) -0.152*** -0.129*** -0.074*** -0.089***  -0.137*** -0.127*** -0.099*** -0.097** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.029)  (0.007) (0.029) (0.017) (0.041) 
   × Inverse road density  -0.290***  0.181   -0.224**  0.177 
  (0.088)  (0.113)   (0.096)  (0.114) 
   × log(country population)  -0.047***  -0.156   -0.073***  -0.160 
  (0.007)  (0.096)   (0.011)  (0.106) 
   × log(GDP per capita), PPP  -0.083***  -0.065   -0.057  -0.039 
  (0.023)  (0.068)   (0.039)  (0.085) 
   × Trade, % GDP  -0.090***  0.083**   -0.381***  0.139 
  (0.017)  (0.033)   (0.070)  (0.086) 
   × Non-agric. sectors, % GDP  -0.100  0.269   0.370*  0.247 
  (0.117)  (0.238)   (0.198)  (0.323) 
   × Gov. expend., % GDP  -0.674***     -0.517***   
  (0.053)     (0.081)   
   × Std. dev. of GDP growth  -1.320**     1.532   
  (0.618)     (1.051)   
   × log(land area)  0.017***     0.000   
  (0.004)     (0.007)   
   × Number of cities/1000  -0.040     -0.041   
  (0.060)     (0.061)   
   × Year  0.004***  0.001   0.004***  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.002)   (0.001)  (0.003) 
   × Constant -1.179*** -1.127*** country spec.  -1.195*** -1.153*** country spec. 
 (0.006) (0.008)    (0.008) (0.010)   
Constant country-year spec. country-year spec.   country-year spec. country-year spec. 
R2 0.975 0.977 0.982 0.982      
Obs cities 6975 6975 6975 6975  6975 6975 6975 6975 
Obs country-year 63 63 63 63  63 63 63 63 
Obs countries 24 24 24 24   24 24 24 24 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Interacted variables are mean-shifted. Instruments are dummy variables for public and private telephony monop-
oly, EU/EEC-, NAFTA-membership. 
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more equal city size distribution, so we expect the coefficient on population to be negative 
while that on land area should be positive. Although we do not constrain the coefficients 
to be equal, these two variables could pick up other effects, thus introducing some ambi-
guity about the expected signs on their coefficients. Given our focus on more developed 
countries we have no strong prior on the sign of the coefficient on GDP. Models in the 
New Economic Geography tradition predict that our measure of trade openness (trade as a 
percentage of GDP) should have a negative effect on spatial concentration and hence on 
the Zipf coefficient because international trade weakens agglomeration forces (See Chap-
ter 18 of Fujita et al., 1999). Similarly, we would expect higher agricultural production to 
lead to less concentration and a flatter city size distribution. That is, we expect the coeffi-
cient on non-agricultural sectors as a percentage of GDP to be positive. A measure of the 
size of government (government expenditure as a share of GDP) allows for the possibility 
that larger governments may imply higher population concentration. That would indeed 
be the case if (as Ades and Glaeser (1995) emphasize) rent seeking behaviour encourages 
citizens to locate close to policy makers in the capital city. Conversely, large governments 
have more means to work against agglomeration forces and support peripheral regions 
through regional policies. Thus we have no strong priors on the sign of the coefficient on 
government expenditure. 
 Finally, we include the standard deviation of the rate of growth of real GDP since the 
theory underlying our approach (discussed in Appendix A) indicates that a higher volatil-
ity of total factor productivity shocks should lead to a larger variance of the size distribu-
tion and therefore larger Zipf coefficients. We also include a time trend to capture system-
atic changes in the Zipf coefficient across time and the number of cities as a convenient 
way of allowing for non-linearities in the Zipf regression.7 
Results reported in column [2] are in line with our expectations for all variables except 
the inverse of road density, trade as a percentage of GDP, and the volatility of GDP. In-
troducing country fixed effects and instrumenting for phone lines per capita alters these 
findings so we consider the issue no further for now. Instead, we draw attention to the fact 
that introducing all of these controls does not change our conclusion on the role of phone 
lines. The coefficient is somewhat smaller in absolute value, but still negative and highly 
significant. Thus, introducing a large number of additional controls does not change our 
conclusion that telephone lines are associated with more concentrated city size distribu-
tions. 
Columns [3] and [4] of Table 2 report results after introducing a country-specific fixed 
effect, that is, from estimating Equation (6) rather than Equation (5). Column [3] reports 
results when phone lines are the only explanatory variable in
ctX . Column [4] reports re-
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 Several recent studies, e.g. Black and Henderson (2003), have emphasised that the 
log rank - log population relationship is often concave. The relationship therefore exhib-
its a steep (negative) slope for the highest ranked cities and a flatter (still negative) slope 
for lower rank cities. Increasing the number of cities may therefore have a positive im-
pact on the coefficient. 
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sults when we include the additional control variables. Note that the coefficients for four 
time invariant variables cannot be identified in the fixed effect specification. These vari-
ables are time invariant either because of data availability (government expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, standard deviation of GDP growth) or because they show very little 
time series variation (land area and number of cities). Moving from column [2] to column 
[3] we see that introducing unobservable country-specific effects further decreases the ab-
solute value of the coefficient on phone lines, although the coefficient remains negative 
and highly significant. Introducing additional controls in column [4] leaves the effect of 
telephone lines per capita essentially unchanged. As mentioned above, the introduction of 
fixed effects now gives us signs on inverse road density and on trade as a percentage of 
GDP (even if the former is just insignificant) that are consistent with our theory, given a 
country’s economic fundamentals as measured here. Thus, our finding that telephone lines 
are associated with more dispersed city size distributions is robust to controlling for other 
country characteristics both observed and unobserved. 
Of course, one may still worry that the relationship is being driven by time varying un-
observed characteristics of countries and that it is changes in these unobserved character-
istics that drive changes in urban structure which, in turn drive changes in our explanatory 
variables. For example, increasing car ownership may lead to the dispersion of population 
and telephone lines then respond to that dispersion (rather than vice versa). To control for 
this, we adopt the standard solution of looking for an instrumental variable that is (i) cor-
related with the number of telephone lines and (ii) not in itself a determinant of the city 
size distribution. We construct two such variables based on the market structure in the 
telecommunications sector. We can identify three broad market structures for the coun-
tries in our sample: competitive, public or private monopoly. The instruments that we use 
are dummies for whether the country has a public monopoly or a private monopoly with a 
competitive structure as the excluded category. Clearly, market structure will affect the 
number of phone lines but it is very unlikely to be driven by the city size distribution thus 
satisfying the first condition for a valid instrument. In addition, we expect it to play no in-
dependent role in determining the city size distribution thus satisfying the second condi-
tion for a valid instrument. 
One might have similar concerns about inverse road density as a proxy for transport 
costs. That is, more dispersed population leads to more roads and lower transport costs 
rather than transport costs driving population dispersion. We have experimented with 
lagged road density as an instrument but this resulted in considerable reductions in sample 
size and little change in the coefficient on road density. As our main interest is in the ICT 
variables, which we are able to instrument, we do not worry about this further other than 
to note that the coefficients on inverse road density should be interpreted with caution.  
We have had more success with finding an instrument for trade as a percentage of GDP. 
Here, we use the fact that the decision to join regional trade agreements is associated with 
large changes in trade volumes, but surely uncorrelated with the city size distribution. 
Given the particular sample of countries that we consider we define two dummies, one for 
membership in NAFTA and a second for the membership in the EU (or EEC depending 
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on time period) and use these as an instrument for trade. Finally, we assume that all other 
right hand side variables are exogenous. 
First stage regression results are reported in Table 4. In the cross section, public mo-
nopolies decrease the number of telephone lines while private sector monopolies increase 
them. Once we have included a fixed effect we see that both are positively associated with 
the number of phone lines. Some of the time series variation in these variables comes 
from liberalization that moved countries from private monopolies to competition. Most of 
the variation, however, comes from privatization coupled with liberalization which moved 
countries from public monopolies to competition.8 Our results may be explained as fol-
lows. At least in terms of the number of phone lines, the efficiency effects of liberalization 
were outweighed by changes to public service agreements and the tendency for newly pri-
vatized firms to reduce the cross-subsidisation of residential lines by business users. In 
terms of the instruments for trade, entering into preferential trade agreements increases 
trade as expected. 
Columns [5]-[8] in Table 2 show what happens when we use these variables to instru-
ment for the number of phone lines and for trade as a percentage of GDP. Column [5] ig-
nores country fixed effects and includes instrumented phone lines as the only explanatory 
variable. Comparing to column [1] we see that our results are essentially unchanged. The 
same is true as we introduce more explanatory variables (compare column [6] to column 
[2]), if we introduce fixed effects with phone lines on their own (column [7] versus col-
umn [3]) and if we introduce fixed effects and time-varying explanatory variables (col-
umn [8]).9 Comparing columns [2] and [6] illustrates that instrumenting for phone lines 
per capita seems to be important in assessing the effect of GDP volatility on urban struc-
ture. In column [6] we obtain that GDP volatility has a positive coefficient as the theory 
above predicts. The effect is very large, although very imprecisely measured since it is not 
significant at the 10% level. 
In sum, we find a robust negative significant effect of the number of phone lines per 
capita on the Zipf coefficient. Over our study period, increasing phone lines per capita 
have tended to cause the dispersion of population resulting in a more concentrated city 
size distribution. 
Columns [1] and [2] in Table 3 show that we reach a similar conclusion for the impact 
of the internet on the city size distribution. Column [1] presents results from a regression 
of Zipf coefficients on the number of internet users per capita. That is, from estimating 
equation (6) with internet users per capita as the only explanatory variable (
ctX ). We see 
a negative significant effect on the Zipf coefficient, although the effect is much smaller 
than that of phone lines. Column [2] shows what happens when we introduce the same 
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 During the time period we consider there were no privatisations that replace a public 
monopoly with a private monopoly, although this had certainly happened in earlier peri-
ods (e.g. in the United Kingdom). 
9
 The only change is that trade as a percentage of GDP is just insignificant in the final 
specification (it is significant at the 10.5% level). 
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additional controls as we did for phone lines. If anything, introducing additional controls 
increases the absolute value of the coefficient on internet users per capita. Columns [3] 
and [4] show that the negative effect of phones and internet use is robust to considering 
both variables together, providing that we also include the additional controls. Results, not 
reported here, show that instrumenting by means of the same set of instrumental variables 
gives the same sign on the coefficients, but that neither are significant. The decrease in 
significance is particularly marked for internet usage which is not surprising given that the 
motivation for using market structure to instrument for internet usage is much weaker. 
Table 3: Internet users, phone lines and the city size distribution 
 OLS 
 Dep. variable log(rank-0.5) [1] [2]  [3] [4] 
log(city size)      
   × log(Internet users per capita) -0.015*** -0.025***  0.002 -0.028*** 
 (0.001) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.004) 
   × log(Phone lines per capita)    -0.200*** -0.400*** 
    (0.009) (0.025) 
   × Inverse road density  -0.757***   -0.851*** 
  (0.120)   (0.117) 
   × log(country population)  -0.040***   -0.096*** 
  (0.010)   (0.010) 
   × log(GDP per capita), PPP  -0.255***   0.055 
  (0.030)   (0.035) 
   × Trade, \% GDP  -0.047**   0.038* 
  (0.022)   (0.022) 
   × Non-agric. sectors , % GDP  0.491***   0.237 
  (0.158)   (0.155) 
   × Gov. expend., % GDP  -0.934***   -0.868*** 
  (0.079)   (0.077) 
   × Std. dev. of GDP growth  -2.959***   -2.791*** 
  (0.921)   (0.898) 
   × log(land area)  0.023***   0.061*** 
  (0.005)   (0.005) 
   × Number of cities/1000  -0.110   0.007 
  (0.078)   (0.077) 
   × Year  0.015***   0.018*** 
  (0.002)   (0.002) 
   × Constant -1.342*** -1.245***  -1.103*** -0.995*** 
 (0.003) (0.023)  (0.011) (0.027) 
Constant country-year specific   country-year specific 
R2 0.973 0.978   0.976 0.979 
Obs cities 4906 4906  4906 4906 
Obs country-year 41 41  41 41 
Obs countries 23 23   23 23 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. Interacted variables are mean-shifted. Instruments are dummy vari-
ables for public and private telephony monopoly, EU/EEC-, NAFTA -membership. 
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That is, in many countries internet access services are provided by firms that may be unre-
lated to the traditional telecommunications providers. Only 16 countries have more than 
one year of data for internet usage so, not surprisingly, implementing the fixed effects 
specification gives insignificant results. We do still get the same signs for the coefficients, 
however. Finally, introducing fixed effects and instrumenting leads to coefficients that are 
essentially zero.10 This is hardly surprising given the limited number of observations and 
the fact that market structure in the telecommunications sector does not provide good in-
struments for the number of internet connections. 
6.1. Some details on instrumentation and additional robustness checks 
A careful inspection of our auxiliary results, the first-stage regressions reported in Table 
4, suggests that abolishing of public monopolies increases phone lines in the cross-section 
(specification [6], Table 2 and 4) and reduces phone lines in the fixed effects estimation 
(specification [8], Table 2 and 4). In principle there are theoretical arguments for both. 
However, in both cases the predicted phone lines from the first stage regressions are in-
creasing over time. The general increase of telephone mainlines is explained by the time 
trend as well as increases in population, road density, and GDP. The positive sign of pub-
lic and private monopolies means that abolishing these monopolies lowered the number of 
phones lines when it occurred (in a jump). This jump may be an extreme prediction. We 
therefore investigated this further by using as an additional instrument the dummy vari-
able whether there is a public or private monopoly interacted with the time trend. This ad-
ditional analysis shows that abolishing monopolies generally reduces phone lines signifi-
cantly in a jump, and then is followed by slightly (but not significant) faster growth there-
after. In the respective second stage for specification [8], the effect of phone lines is even 
stronger, -0.106, and now significant at 1%. The trade variable now also becomes signifi-
cant, although with a sign opposite to what the New Economic Geography theory would 
predict. 
A second question concerning the nature of our instrumental variables strategy arises 
from considering the literature on the political economy of urbanization. This literature 
raises the possibility that urban concentration may be driven by the general degree of 
competition in the economic and political spheres. This raises the possibility that some 
measure of the degree of competition in the economy should be included directly in the 
regression, violating the second requirement for the validity of an instrument (that it 
should have no direct effect on urban structure). Using this line of reasoning, one could 
argue, for example, that the industrial organization of the telecommunications sector is ac-
tually just proxying for an overly centralized public sector which favours larger cities. To 
summarise, if industrial organization of the telecommunications sector is capturing other 
factors that have a direct effect on urban concentration, then it is inappropriate as an in-
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 These results are available on request. 
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strument. We explore this possibility by controlling for the general degree of competition 
in the economy using the OECD “RegRef” indicators of regulatory conditions in the air-
lines, telecommunications, electricity, gas, post, rail, and road freight industries of mem-
ber countries (Conway and Nicoletti (2006)). The OECD claims that the RegRef indica-
tors are a good proxy for the overall degree of competition in the economy. The RegRef 
indicators are, unfortunately, only available for a subset of the countries in our data set. 
Table 4: First stage regressions for Error! Reference source not found. 
 [5]  [6]  [7]  [8] 
Dep. Variable log phone   log phone log trade   log phone   log phone log trade 
log(city size)          
   × public monopoly -0.631***  -0.055*** -0.073***  -0.268***  0.242*** -0.060*** 
 (0.013)  (0.010) (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.004) (0.005) 
   × private monopoly -0.285***  0.072*** -0.053***  -0.261***  0.037*** -0.104*** 
 (0.018)  (0.013) (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.004) (0.005) 
   × EU 0.159***  0.255*** 0.002  0.188***  -0.210*** 0.105*** 
 (0.012)  (0.012) (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.005) (0.005) 
   × NAFTA 0.332***  -0.053*** 0.163***  0.196***  0.003 0.224*** 
 (0.020)  (0.013) (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.007) (0.007) 
   × Inverse road density   -1.285*** 0.358***    -0.056 -0.035 
   (0.098) (0.061)    (0.037) (0.041) 
   × log(country population)   -0.305*** -0.090***    -2.450*** -1.431*** 
   (0.009) (0.006)    (0.051) (0.056) 
   × log(GDP per capita), PPP   1.060*** 0.029**    -0.458*** -0.540*** 
   (0.023) (0.014)    (0.022) (0.025) 
   × Non-agric. sectors , % GDP   3.467*** 2.012***    5.302*** 1.223*** 
   (0.125) (0.077)    (0.059) (0.066) 
   × Gov. expend., % GDP   1.226*** 0.549***      
   (0.056) (0.035)      
   × Std. dev. of GDP growth   18.629*** 10.347***      
   (0.652) (0.403)      
   × log(land area)   0.192*** -0.075***      
   (0.005) (0.003)      
   × Number of cities/1000   0.557*** -0.007      
   (0.073) (0.045)      
   × Year   0.008*** -0.004***    0.055*** 0.012*** 
   (0.001) (0.001)    (0.000) (0.001) 
   × Constant 0.964***  0.050*** -0.068***  country specific 
 (0.008)  (0.010) (0.006)      
Constant country-year specific   country-year specific 
F-Test instruments a 1152.0  257.1 116.5  920.6  1515.1 277.6 
R2 0.873  0.966 0.775  0.979  0.998 0.953 
Obs cities 6975  6975 6975  6975  6975 6975 
Obs country-year 63  63 63  63  63 63 
Obs countries 24   24 24   24   24 24 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. Interacted variables are mean-shifted. Instruments are dummy variables for 
public and private telephony monopoly, EU/EEC-, NAFTA -membership. 
a Jointly tests public and private telephony monopoly, EU/EEC-, NAFTA-membership. 
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Specifically, data are not available for Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Ro-
mania, Russian Federation, and Slovak Republic leaving 45 country-year pairs instead of 
the 63 pairs originally. Re-estimation of the original model with the reduced set of coun-
tries produces a stronger effect for phone lines, -0.296, which is significant at 1%. Includ-
ing the average of all RegRef indicators as an additional explanatory variable only slightly 
reduces the effect of phone lines to -0.272 and its significance to 2%. The coefficient on 
this new explanatory variable is close to zero and highly insignificant. Taken together 
these results suggest that concerns about the validity of our instrument as a result of po-
litical economy stories are theoretically interesting, but empirically invalid. 
Finally, we consider what happens with other measures of urban concentration. Specifi-
cally, we have experimented with the Gini index, the normalized Herfindahl concentration 
index and the variance as dependent variables. These measures reflect different aspects of 
dispersion. The variance, a standard measure of dispersion, averages the squared devia-
tions from the mean. The normalized Herfindahl concentration index reflects squared 
normalized city sizes. The Gini coefficient is the mean absolute deviation among all pairs 
of cities, relative to the mean city size. Results for the coefficient on telephone lines for 
same eight specifications (with the all controls entered without being interacted with 
ln(city size)) as in Table 2 are reported in Table 5. Note that all estimations using those al-
Table 5: Effect of phone lines using alternative measures of urban concentration 
 OLS  IV 
Dep. variable [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Effect of log(Phone lines per capita), one-step estimation (Table 2) 
Zipf Coefficient  -0.152*** -0.129*** -0.074*** -0.089***  -0.137*** -0.127*** -0.099*** -0.097** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.029)  (0.007) (0.029) (0.017) (0.041) 
Effect of log(Phone lines per capita), two-step estimation 
Zipf Coefficient  -0.481*** -0.848*** -0.189*** -0.386**  -0.374** -2.325 -0.121* -0.459 
 (0.106) (0.191) (0.046) (0.174)  (0.167) (1.776) (0.069) (0.309) 
Gini coefficient -0.162*** -0.425*** -0.068*** -0.154**  -0.141* -1.809 -0.055** -0.106 
 (0.051) (0.106) (0.018) (0.062)  (0.080) (1.392) (0.027) (0.119) 
Herfindahl index -0.110*** -0.212*** -0.032*** -0.053  -0.172*** -1.13 -0.018 -0.043 
 (0.032) (0.069) (0.009) (0.032)  (0.052) (0.915) (0.013) (0.071) 
Sample variance -2.925*** -0.771 -1.508* -2.26  -4.349*** -6.581 -0.272 -4.388 
 (0.824) (1.601) (0.820) (2.493)  (1.316) (11.698) (1.238) (6.365) 
Country fixed effects no no yes yes  no no yes yes 
Control variables a) no yes no yes  no yes no yes 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.  
a) Includes the same set of control variables as in Table 2. 
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ternative measures are based on a two-step procedure11 and therefore are less efficient 
than the one-step estimation in Table 2. For comparison, we therefore also report the two-
step estimation using the Zipf coefficient as dependent variable. The results for the two-
step using Zipf are qualitatively identical to the one-step results. Due to the loss of effi-
ciency, they are not always significant.  
Remarkably for such different measures of dispersion, the results for the coefficients of 
telephones line per capita with the Gini and Herfindahl indices as dependent variables are 
– up to a scale factor – very similar to the two-step using Zipf. The coefficients with the 
sample variance as a dependent variable are also negative and thus consistent with our 
findings using the Zipf coefficient. It is worth emphasising, however, that our choice of 
Zipf coefficient as a measure for urban concentration is not arbitrary, being driven instead 
by a desire to link our empirical results firmly with our theoretical model of urban struc-
ture. In contrast, while all three of these alternative measures of urban concentration ap-
pear intuitive, when estimated on the truncated sample of larger cities they are not consis-
tent estimators of the population variables and cannot be linked to our theoretical predic-
tion of decreasing variance for all cities. For this reason, the Zipf coefficient results repre-
sent our preferred specification and we take these robustness checks as broadly consistent 
with our overall findings.  
7. Policy Discussion and Conclusion 
We find robust evidence that increases in the number of telephone lines per capita lead to 
a more concentrated distribution of city sizes and so correspondingly to more dispersion 
in the distribution of economic activity in space. The model we presented in Section 2 ra-
tionalizes this empirical result. As access to telephones improves, the ensuing changes in 
city size distributions imply that local production externalities decrease. That results in an 
urban structure that is less dependent on past shocks and hence a size distribution of cities 
with smaller variance. This smaller variance is reflected in Zipf coefficients that are larger 
in absolute value.  
Figure 3 illustrates the magnitude of our empirical results. It assumes that the size dis-
tribution of city sizes is Pareto and plots the distribution we estimate (labelled ‘actual’ in 
the figure) and the distribution we would expect if the mean of the log of phone lines per 
capita increases by one standard deviation. The figure also compares these two distribu-
tions with the one associated with Zipf’s law, that is, a Pareto distribution with coefficient 
minus one, according to Equation (2). The increase in phone lines per capita concentrates 
the distribution, by making the Zipf relationship steeper. If ICT improves, cities are not as 
large. For example, the share of cities with more than a million inhabitants is reduced by 
two percentage points. Since the share of cities with populations larger than 1 million is 
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 In the first step, the measure (Zipf coefficient, Gini coefficient, Herfindahl index, 
sample variance) is estimated for every country and year from observed city sizes. In the 
second step, the measure is regressed on ln(Phone lines per capita) and control variables. 
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about 10%, this implies a 20% decrease in the number of these large cities. This is a sig-
nificant change in urban structure! 
We argue that the internet is likely to have similar, or even larger, effects on urban 
structures once its use has spread more thoroughly through the different economies. So far 
the evidence on internet usage is more speculative, although it goes in the same direction. 
The data suggest that as the number of internet users increases we should see effects that 
are about one tenth of the size of the ones we observe for phone lines. As we argue in the 
introduction, massive internet adoption is a fairly recent phenomenon, and at least in so 
far as our measurement of the extent of its adoption is concerned, urban structure may 
take some time to adjust. This may explain the small coefficients we find in the data. 
We find that public and private monopolies on average reduce the number of phone 
lines per capita. An average country with a public monopoly will therefore have a more 
dispersed city size distribution of cities. More agents will be concentrated in a few large 
cities. These effects are also economically large. If the average country with a public tele-
phone monopoly transitions to a competitive telecommunications sector, our results indi-
cate that the change in the distribution of city sizes should be about half as large as the 
change in Figure 3, but in the opposite direction. That is, the Zipf curve will become flat-
ter as the number of larger cities increases. According to our calculations above, this 
change would lead to an increase of around 10% in the number of cities with more than a 
million residents. 
Even though the analysis in this paper allows us to derive conclusions about the effect 
of ICT on the urban structure, as it stands it is not designed to derive implications on wel-
fare. So far we can conclude that according to the theory above, ICT causes a decrease in 
the strength of intra-urban spillovers. That is, ICT reduces the importance of local factors 
of production on the city's productivity and has led to the evolution of a more uniform dis-
tribution of cities. So far, it looks like ICT trades off spatial concentration of economic ac-
tivity for total factor productivity, and thus bears a conceptual similarity to infrastructure 
and other regional policies, that are discussed by Martin (1999) and Baldwin et al. (2003), 
Ch. 17, and typically generate tradeoffs. However, increases in the scope (from urban to 
possibly national or international) of spillovers or factor complementarities are likely to 
be associated with ICT. As the scope of externalities increases, we should also expect in-
creases in the growth rate of total factor productivity everywhere. ICT implies not only 
smaller local spillovers but also larger national or international spillovers. In this sense, 
ICT would behave more like the “win-win” policies discussed in ibid., p. 444.   
This paper studies the first effect of ICT that leads to changes in the size distribution of 
cities. The second effect, on spillovers at a larger spatial scope, will not affect the distribu-
tion of economic activity in space, but is likely to have important implications for the 
growth in the mean of the distribution of total factor productivity shocks. In order to un-
derstand the welfare effects of ICT, one needs to account for both the local and national or 
international effects. As a first step, we have studied the local implications of ICT only. 
The theory presented above implies that we can expect to see agents reallocating across 
cities as a result of improvements in ICT. Moreover, our empirical results imply both that 
the reallocation that we have observed, and that will likely observe in the future, are sub-
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stantial. Moving costs are also important and we have not commented on them so far in 
this paper. Some of these costs are due to regulation and lack of flexibility in labour mar-
kets. Others reflect frictions in the adjustment of urban public infrastructure. Yet other 
costs are due to the cost of selling and buying homes, and the actual transport and organ-
izational costs involved in moving across cities. Our results highlight the importance of 
government policy in reducing this type of costs. If moving costs are artificially high, be-
cause of government regulation and interference, economies will not be able to take ad-
vantage of the gains associated with the ICT improvements, since agents will not respond 
by redistributing themselves accordingly in space.  
It is imperative to allow for the natural reallocation that will result from further im-
provements in ICT. After all, this reallocation across space is the adjustment by the indi-
viduals and by firms to an economic environment where physical location is becoming 
less important. 
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 APPENDIX A: A Model of ICT, Urban Evolution and City Size Distributions 
We illustrate how to study the role of ICT on the urban hierarchy by considering the basic 
theoretical model in RHW. Total factor productivity, that is the level of technology, in in-
dustry j  at time t  is given by  
j j
tj tj tj tjA A H N
γ ε
=
% % %
, 
where tjN%  and tjH%  denote the city's total employment and industry j  specific human 
capital, and ln tjA  is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) productivity shock 
with mean zero and variance ν . Thus parameters jγ  and jε  determine the importance of 
knowledge spillovers from total employment in industry j and industry j-specific human 
capital in the economy, which are external to individual firms in the industry but internal 
to the urban economy due to the presence of city developers. If both parameters jγ  and 
jε are equal to zero there are no external effects and economic activity has no incentive to 
agglomerate in cities. The larger both of these parameters the more important are a city's 
total human capital and employment in determining tjA% city-specific total factor productiv-
ity industry j. 
A very simple way to introduce the effect of ICT is therefore to let these two parameters 
vary with the quality of information technology, .ι  Namely, let ( )j tγ ι  where 
( ) / 0j t tγ ι ι∂ ∂ <  and, similarly, let ( )j tε ι  be such that ( ) / 0j t tε ι ι∂ ∂ < . Essentially, this 
assumption amounts to ICT’s increasing the importance of agglomeration effects since 
people located far away can now interact at a smaller cost and so people living in the city 
are less important in determining the city's productivity level. Conversely, we could as-
sume that both ( )j tγ ι  and ( )j tε ι  depend positively on the quality of ICT, which would 
be consistent with arguments that emphasize the greater importance of public goods as a 
result of changes in ICT. Which effect dominates is, ultimately, an empirical question that 
we try to settle in this paper. 
In order for city sizes to be well defined, it will be clarified shortly below that we need 
to guarantee that the knowledge spillover parameters jγ  and jε satisfy 
( ) ( ) 1 / 2j jγ ι ε ι+ <  for all ι . Otherwise, cities would, in a sense, be too productive and 
therefore would grow unboundedly since agglomeration effects would dominate conges-
tion costs at all population levels. As long as this condition is satisfied, as a city grows 
eventually congestion costs become more important than agglomeration costs and so city 
sizes are finite.  
Cities consist of a central business centre, where all agents work and all production is 
located, and residential areas surrounding it. Each agent consumes the services of one unit 
of land per period. For spatial equilibrium within each city agents should be indifferent 
about where to live in the city. Therefore, equilibrium rents at a distance z from the centre 
should obey ( )( )R z z zτ= − , where z  denotes a city’s radius, where rent is equal to 0. 
Hence, total rents in a city of radius z  are given by  
3
23
0
2 ( )
3 2
z bTR zR z dz z Nπτπ= = =∫ % . 
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since everyone in the city lives in one unit of land, a city of population N~  and 
.3/2 2
1
τπ≡ −b  Total commuting costs are given by  
3
2
0
2
z
TCC z zdz bNπ τ= =∫ % .  
Assuming the presence of city developers or governments that internalize city-wide ex-
ternalities, RHW show that in this framework the unique equilibrium allocation may be 
obtained as a solution to the following planning problem: Choose state contingent se-
quences { } ,0, 1, , , , , , Jtj tj tj tj tj tj tj t jC X N u K Hµ ∞= =  to maximize 
0
0 1
(1 ) ln /
J
t
t ti t
t i
E N C Nδ δ
∞
= =
  
−   
  
∑ ∑  (A.1) 
subject to, for all t  and j , 
3
2 1
1
j j j j j j
j jtj tj tj tj
tj tj tj tj tj tj
tj tj tj tj
N K H N
C X b A u
β α γ α β ε
α βµ µ
µ µ µ µ
+ − − +
− −
       
+ + ≤              
       
, (A.2) 
1
J
t tj
j
N N
=
= ∑ , (A.3) 
1
1
j j
t j tj tjK K X
ω ω−
+ = , (A.4) 
0 1
1 (1 )t j tj j tj jH H B u B+  = + −  , (A.5) 
where: , ,tj tj tjN K X  and tjH denote total employment, total physical capital, physical capi-
tal investment, and total human capital in industry j in the economy and jα and jβ  are 
positive parameters satisfying 0 1j jα β< + < ; tjC  denotes total consumption of repre-
sentative household i, and tjµ  the number of cities producing goods in industry j ; tju  
denotes the fraction of time agent i devotes to work. Thus, the maximization problem 
above amounts to maximizing the sum total of households’ lifetime utilities, (A.1), sub-
ject to: a resource constraint, Equation (A.2), which expresses that the use of resources for 
consumption, investment, and commuting costs may not exceed current output (and pre-
supposes that rents are redistributed back to the city residents); a labour market equilib-
rium condition, Equation (A.3), according to which the total labour force is allocated to all 
industries; and the two factor accumulation equations, for physical and human capital. 
That is, respectively, Equation (A.4), according to which current investment and the exist-
ing capital stock produce capital stock in the next period (with jω being a parameter satis-
fying 0 1jω< < ), and Equation (A.5), where human capital is augmented at a rate that 
depends on the portion of each individual’s endowment of leisure not allocated for work.  
  The problem of maximizing with respect to the number of cities tjµ  is a static problem 
with first order condition 
( ) 212 j j j j j j j j j jj jtj
tj tj tj tj tj tj tj
tj
N
s A K H N u
b
β α γ α β ε α β γ εγ ε µ
µ
+ − − + − − − −
 +
 = =
  
. 
So the size of a city, tjs , with core industry j  is then given by  
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( ) ( )11 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
2
ˆ
j j
j j j j jj j
tj j tj tj tj tj tjs F A H K N ub
γ ε
α β α β φγ ε − + − −
  +  =      
, (A.6) 
where the auxiliary variables ˆtjA , ˆ jα , ˆ jβ ,and ˆjφ  are defined as: 
( )
1
1 2
ˆ j j
tj tjA A
γ ε− +
= , ( )ˆ 1 2
j j
j
j j
α γ
α
γ ε
+
=
− +
, 
( )ˆ 1 2
j
j
j j
ββ
γ ε
=
− +
, and ( )
1
ˆ
1 2
j j
j
j j
α βφ
γ ε
− −
=
− +
. 
Given this log-linear specification, RHW show that capital investments and consump-
tion in each industry are constant fractions of output net of commuting costs, and the frac-
tion of time devoted to work tju  is constant across time. Taking natural logarithms of both 
sides of Equation (6) that defines city size, we get 
( )
( )
( )
21 1
ˆln 2 ln ln ln
1 2 1 2
j j
tj tj tj j tj
j j j j
s A K
b
γ ε
ψ β
γ ε γ ε
 +
 = + + +
 
− + − + 
 (A.7) 
where the auxiliary variable tjψ  includes all non-stochastic variables that enter the plan-
ning problem, including tjN  and tjH . 
If ln tjA  and tjK  are the sole stochastic variables in Equation (A.7), then the mean and 
variance of city sizes are easily obtained and given, respectively, by  
( )
( ) ( )21 ˆln 2 ln ln
1 2
j j
tj tj j tj
j j
s E K
b
γ ε
ψ β
γ ε
 +
 = + +
 
− + 
, (A.8) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
0
1
ˆln 4 4 ln
1 2tj j tjj j
V s V Kν β
γ ε
 
 = +
 
− + 
. 
It is now clear why condition ( ) ( ) 1 / 2j jγ ι ε ι+ <  must hold. They are to ensure that 
the mean and variance of the city size distribution are mathematically well defined. RHW 
show that as ∞→t  the variance of the log of physical capital in industry j is:  
( )0 2ln ˆ1tj jV K
ν
β
  = 
+
,  
so that the variance of the long run log-city size distribution may be obtained from (A.8) 
and given by  
( ) ( )
2 2
0
1ln 4
1 2 1 2
j
tj
j j j j j
V s
β
ν
γ ε γ ε β
    
      = +      
− + − + +     
.(A.9) 
Note that the variance of the city size distribution is then increasing in ( ) ( )j t j tγ ι ε ι+ . 
Therefore, any assumption that we make about the dependence of these elasticities on ICT 
is reflected on changes on the invariant distribution of city sizes. 
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We would also like to connect the variance of the distribution of city sizes to the Zipf's 
coefficient, in order to be able to connect our theoretical results with the data through this 
coefficient. The local Zipf coefficient is given by the elasticity of the counter-cumulative 
of the city size distribution, ( )P s S> , with respect to city size, 
( ) ( )
( )
0
P s SSS
P s S S
ζ ∂ >= <
> ∂
. 
Given the mean of the distribution of city sizes, as we increase the variance we are 
shifting mass to the tails of the distribution. This implies that for S  high enough (large 
enough city sizes) the term ( )Sζ  will be smaller the larger the variance. As the vari-
ance goes to infinity, ( ) 2,Sζ > −  ( )limS Sζ→∞  converges to the Pareto coefficient.  
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